The case of Law 27,795, which bears the name “Law on financing university education and recomposition of teaching salaries”, Also known as Financing of University Education, it clearly exposes one of the main institutional debates of these times: what is the constitutional margin that the Republic has to enforce a democratic decision of Congress against the Milei government. The sequence by which it becomes a law is more than interesting, since it had Dantean overtones and that is why the issue ends in a judicialized dispute; The law, on August 6, 2025, obtained half a sanction in the Chamber of Deputies. Then, on August 21, it goes to the upper house and has its sanction by the Senate.
However The Milei government completely vetoed the law, approved by both chambers through decree 647/25 of September 10, 2025. This caused Congress to use the mechanism provided for in Article 83 of the National Constitution and insisted on sanctioning the original text by aggravated majority: first the Chamber of Deputies on September 17 and then the Senate on October 2 of last year. In this way, the law was definitively sanctioned, even though the famous presidential veto existed in the middle.
Until then, the classic constitutional scheme worked: Congress legislates, the Executive can veto, and Parliament retains the power to insist. The problem came later.
Through decree 759/25, published in the Official Gazette on October 21 of last year, the Executive Branch promulgated the law, but at the same time established that its execution would be suspended until Congress determined the sources of financing and will incorporate the corresponding budget items. The basis invoked was Art. 38 of the Financial Administration Law. This is extremely interesting, since certainly Art. 38 of the LAF understands that it is pertinent for all laws to state the origin of the budget, that is, where the money is going to come from, but in Argentina no Budget has been voted on for years!
This legal recourse, which was nothing more than an evasive maneuver, means that once the procedure provided for by the Constitution had been exhausted, the norm was no longer under legislative discussion but in the stage of mandatory compliance. Therefore, The decree generated an obvious legal conflict: if the presidential veto had already been reversed by both chambers, it was mandatory for the Executive to comply with it. Faced with this, the National Interuniversity Council and different national universities promoted an amparo action requesting the declaration of unconstitutionality of the decree and immediate compliance with the law. They also requested an urgent precautionary measure regarding the articles linked to the recomposition of teaching and non-teaching salaries (Art. 5 and 6 of the aforementioned law).
On December 23, 2025, the Federal Administrative Contentious Court No. 11 granted the precautionary measure. It considered that there was a clear failure to comply with a specific legal duty on the part of the National State and declared decree 759/25 inapplicable with respect to Law 27,795. Likewise, he ordered immediate compliance with articles 5 and 6 of the norm, which indicated two central things: the first is that Teacher increases cannot be less than the CPI, the second is that joint meetings with the unions had to be called at least every 3 months..
This precautionary measure, being an “anticipation” of the sentence, presumes its compliance “from now on.”
What the National State did was appeal that precautionary measure. Among other arguments, he maintained that the measure affected the fiscal balance, that the precautionary requirements were not proven and that the execution of public expenses required specific budgetary provision.
However, just a few days ago, On March 31, 2026, the Federal Administrative Litigation Chamber, Chamber III, confirmed the precautionary measure. The court understood, in essence, that the legislative insistence provided for in Article 83 of the Constitution had validly concluded the procedure for the formation and sanction of the law, and that it was not appropriate to introduce subsequent mechanisms that would neutralize its effectiveness. He also assessed the specific impact on salaries, scholarships and university operations.
From now on, the file enters a decisive stage: the substantive sentence that Judge Martin Cormick must issue. There, not only the precautionary origin will be discussed, but the definitive scope of the right claimed and the consequences of non-compliance by the government.
In this framework, at least two possible future temperaments can be seen:
The first would consist of ordering comprehensive compliance with the law with retroactive effect, which would imply recognizing and paying all salary differences and updates omitted since the entry into force of the standard.. That is, to economically repair the period in which the State refused to apply the law, which the government estimates at $1,069,644,600,000, which in words would be one trillion sixty-nine thousand six hundred forty-four million six hundred thousand.
Another possibility may be a solution with future effects, providing that from the sentence onwards the mechanisms provided for by the norm are complied with: salary update in accordance with the CPI and call for quarterly joint meetings, without necessarily recognizing the sums previously accrued.
The case leaves several relevant conclusions:
The case shows that in the republican system no power of the State can assume powers superior to those assigned to it by the Constitution. Congress passed a law, the Executive vetoed it, Congress insisted and Justice intervened when an attempt was made to prevent its application. In short, The discussion on university financing is also a discussion on the division of powers, validity of the law and constitutional limits on the government that is in charge of the Executive Branch, as a former Minister said, whoever makes them, pays for them.
